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1. Introduction
The McKell Institute is an independent, not-for-profit, public 
policy institute dedicated to developing practical policy ideas and 
contributing to public debate. The McKell Institute takes its name 
from New South Wales’ wartime Premier and Governor–General  
of Australia, William McKell.
William McKell made a powerful contribution to both New South Wales and Australian 
society through significant social, economic and environmental reforms
For more information phone (02) 9113 0944 or visit www.mckellinstitute.org.au
About the  
McKell Institute  
Background
The opinions in this report are those of the authors and do not necessarily  
represent the views of the McKell Institute’s members, affiliates,  
individual board members or research committee members.  
Any remaining errors or omissions are the responsibility of the authors.
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has not been commissioned by any of our sponsors or supporters. 
The authors of this paper have utilised a range of publicly available 
information and our own analysis in compiling this paper. 
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Foreword
Since then it has become apparent that Australia’s treatment of taxation on investment 
properties is among the most generous in the world. 
Given the growing crisis faced by first home buyers and also the long term budgetary 
challenges outlined by the Intergenerational Report, it is appropriate that negative gearing is 
once again back in the spotlight.
Previous estimates have put the cost of negative gearing at approximately $4 billion 
a year, indicating significant long term savings to be made if the policy was to be 
abandoned altogether. 
However, this is not the first time that negative gearing has been abolished, with the 
Hawke/Keating government quarantining the concession in 1985 before reinstating it in 
1987 following substantial political pressure.
There is a significant amount of debate surrounding the potential impacts that would flow 
from an outright abolition of negative gearing, with industry sector participants warning 
full abolition will drive up rents and disadvantage low income households. In addition, 
Australia’s 1.8 million property investors are unlikely to respond with enthusiasm towards 
any reform that threatens their wealth and retirement security. Australians have been 
encouraged by successive governments to make long-term investments based on a nearly 
20 year-old policy endorsed by both major political parties.
This report attempts to break the current political impasse by provide a range of politically 
pragmatic proposals that would reform negative gearing without abolishing it outright. In each 
of these scenarios, existing investors 
are quarantined, with negative gearing 
only partially restricted.
In addition, this report has also 
attempted to identify opportunities 
that would restructure negative 
gearing in a way that allows tax 
expenditure to be more directly 
targeted towards the creation  
of new housing supply. Such  
reforms would help tackle Australia’s  
housing affordability issues while also 
delivering a notable improvement in 
the federal budget.
Three years ago, The McKell Institute’s first report:  
Homes For All, highlighted the problems of negatively 
geared housing assets and non-taxed capital gains. 
The Hon John Watkins
CHAIR,  
MCKELL INSTITUTE 
Sam Crosby
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR,  
MCKELL INSTITUTE
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The report considers five different policy options that span the spectrum 
from the status quo to immediate abolition of negative gearing.
Executive  
Summary
First, it allays all reasonable concerns about 
the treatment of current investors, removes any 
concerns of “fire sales”, and would place  
no upward pressure on rental rates. Second, it 
addresses the fundamental issue with housing 
affordability and availability in Australia: inadequate 
housing supply. Allowing negative gearing only for 
new construction would provide powerful incentives 
for increased housing supply. This would have 
multiple benefits in the housing market: (i) greater 
price stability, (ii) increased access for new entrants, 
(iii) lower rental rates, and (iv) provide a boost in 
residential construction with an associated boost 
to employment, economic growth, and taxation 
revenues.
The most economically 
appealing option is to 
allow negative gearing 
for properties that are 
currently negatively geared 
(“grandfathering”) but allow 
new negative gearing only for 
new construction (Scenario 4 
in the report). This reform has 
many appealing features. 
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This report considers five policy options for negative gearing, ranging 
from the status quo to immediate abolition of the current system.
Options for Reform 
Summarised
SCENARIO 1:  
Business as usual: Under this scenario all current 
provisions relating to negative gearing would be 
retained. This is the most expensive option and 
demonstrates why action is urgently needed. The 
cumulative tax expenditure over 10 years would be 
approximately $51 billion.
SCENARIO 2:  
Grandfather existing negatively geared 
properties: Under this scenario existing investors 
taking advantage of negative gearing would be 
allowed to continue to do so for the existing 
properties they own. Newly purchased rental 
properties would not be permitted to use negative 
gearing, but would be allowed to use so-called 
“positive gearing”.  Over 10 years the cumulative 
budget impact is between $19.3 billion and $38.7 
billion.
SCENARIO 3:  
Grandfather existing negatively geared 
properties plus new participants have access 
to negative gearing for up to $1 million of 
property: Here, scenario 2 is augmented with a 
provision for newly negatively geared properties, but 
with a cap on the amount for such new properties. 
The budget impact is greatly reduced and over 10 
years the cumulative impact would be a total of 
$4.7 billion.
SCENARIO 4:  
Grandfather existing negatively geared 
properties plus new negative gearing only for 
new construction: Under this scenario the only 
new negative gearing that would be permitted 
would be for new construction. Taking the base 
case from scenario 2, this would put the cumulative 
10 year budget benefit at $29.3 billion.
SCENARIO 5:  
Abolish negative gearing immediately: Under 
the final scenario we consider, the current tax 
deductibility of losses on investment properties 
would be abolished.
10
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In the case of housing, if the cost of owning 
an investment property, including interest 
on mortgage repayments, is greater than 
the rental income on that property, then that 
loss can be used as an offset against other 
taxable income, including one’s salary. 
The tax advantage is more attractive to 
those on higher incomes due to the greater 
savings accrued through a reduction in 
income taxed in higher tax brackets. In 
theory, the incentive encourages investment 
by reducing the impact of losses in the 
earlier years of a purchase, at least until 
an increase in earnings (or rent) and/or a 
decrease in borrowing costs switches the 
investment from being negatively geared to 
positively geared. 
When the asset is sold, it is also likely 
to have increased somewhat in capital 
value, providing gains to the investor. The 
Government recovers some of this through its 
Capital Gains Tax (CGT), though the revenue 
raised through this measure was substantially 
reduced when the Howard Government 
introduced provisions that halved the rate of 
tax on capital gains in 1998.
It is important, however, to consider the dual 
impact of negative gearing and concessional 
CGT on residential property. The combination 
of the two makes investments in such 
property highly appealing to many Australians.
Proponents of negative gearing have argued 
that the reduction of importance in rental 
yield has effectively put downward pressure 
on rents, which would otherwise be higher 
if rents were increased in line with house 
prices. Opponents of negative gearing have 
argued that, in the long run, negative gearing 
his increased house prices beyond where 
they otherwise would have been, in turn 
increasing rents as landlords are forced to 
increase prices, regardless of the tax offset.
The changes in house prices and rents can 
be seen in the graph below, with house 
prices increasing substantially following the 
Howard government’s 1998 changes, and 
rents rising in excess of inflation since 2007. 
Negative gearing refers to a form of financing whereby an 
investor borrows money to buy an asset, but the income 
generated by that asset (net of other expenses) does not 
cover the interest on the loan. The loss is then deducted 
against other sources of income, for example labour income. 
Negative Gearing; 
Expensive and 
Inefficient
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FIGURE 1 
HOUSE PRICE AND RENT INDEX (AUSTRALIA) (INDEX 100 = JUNE 1987)
The data would seem to indicate that house prices 
have increased in value dramatically since the 
changes to capital gains tax shifted added to the 
incentives provided by negative gearing. Certainly, 
post 1998 saw house prices disconnect completely 
from CPI and rental increases.
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FIGURE 2 
RELATIVE HOUSE PRICE INDEX (AUSTRALIA) (INDEX 100 = 1997)
Whether changes to negative gearing, in 
combination with changes to capital gains, has 
been responsible or not for the steep increases in 
house prices in recent years, the fact that rental 
prices have not increased by similar levels should 
be of critical concern for policy makers when 
considering reforms to negative gearing. 
According to the ATO’s most recent taxation 
statistics, in 2010-11 there were approximately 1.9 
million property investors in Australia, with 1.26 
million of these negatively geared. The average 
income loss for all negatively geared property 
investors was just under $11,000, leading to 
combined losses of approximately $13 billion.1
Were these investors to lose the capacity to 
negatively gear, it is conceivable that a number of 
them would choose to sell their property rather than 
absorb such large-scale losses. Others may attempt 
to reduce the scale of their losses by increasing 
rents, though their capacity to do this would be 
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determined by the vacancy rates in their area. If the 
vacancy rate is high, the capacity to increase rents 
is limited by the likelihood that doing so will make it 
more difficult to secure a tenant. When the vacancy 
rate is low, the reverse holds.
Because of search costs, the long-held view has 
been that a vacancy rate of about 3% represents 
a balanced market that is neither in favour of 
landlords or tenants. Anything above that and 
landlords are forced to offer more competitive 
rates to attract tenants, whereas anything below 
that is likely to indicate a rental shortage, shifting 
the balance towards landowners. 
When negative gearing was temporarily abolished 
between 1985 and 1987, the impact on rents 
varied from city to city, with only Sydney and Perth 
experiencing a surge in rents. Although this issue 
will be examined in some detail in later sections of 
this report, it is worth acknowledging that vacancy 
rates in these two cities were substantially below 
those of other cities.
As policy makers consider reform, it is important 
to acknowledge that vacancy rates nationally are 
currently sitting at 2.2%. 
FIGURE 3 
RENTAL VACANCY RATES
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FIGURE 4 
% OF INVESTMENT LOANS MADE FOR NEW VS EXISTING DWELLINGS
With the exception of Darwin (3.2%), every 
Australian city is currently experiencing vacancy 
rates well below 3%. Sydney (1.7%), Canberra 
(1.6%), Adelaide (1.5%) and Hobart (1.3%) remain 
the most vulnerable to rental price increases, while 
Melbourne (2.3%) and Perth (2.6%) also remain 
vulnerable though somewhat less so.2
These figures suggest that property investors in most 
Australian cities would be well placed to respond 
to any immediate removal of negative gearing 
concessions with a potentially steep increase in 
rents, with tenants already experiencing high levels of 
competition for a limited supply of rental stock. 
This raises a separate question as to why the 
existence of negative gearing has not helped 
to create a stronger supply of rental properties, 
ensuring that vacancy rates remain at or above 3%. 
Opponents of negative gearing argue that 
negative gearing has largely failed to deliver new 
housing supply, with the majority of investors 
preferring to purchase existing dwellings rather 
than options “off the plan”. 
ABS data appears to supports this view, with 
almost 93% of all investment loans today going 
towards the purchase of existing dwellings. 
Over time, a growing proportion of property 
investment loans have gone towards the 
purchase of existing dwellings rather than newly 
created dwellings.3
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There is no obvious reason why existing dwellings 
are proving to be more attractive to property 
investors than new dwellings. Nevertheless, 
it remains clear that the vast majority of the 
Government’s tax expenditure on negative gearing – 
estimated to cost approximately $4 billion per year 
– is going towards property investments that are 
not actually increasing housing supply, undermining 
negative gearing’s original policy intention as a 
mechanism for reducing rents.4
The McKell Institute has written extensively on 
the issues of housing and rental affordability. 
The Institute’s inaugural report, Homes For All, 
specifically listed a shortage of new housing supply 
as one of the single largest determinants of rising 
prices in NSW.5 In a submission the 2014 NSW 
Legislative Council’s Inquiry into Social, Public and 
Affordable Housing, the McKell Institute highlighted 
how new housing supply in Sydney had contracted 
steeply since reaching a peak in 1999-2000.
17
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FIGURE 5 
SYDNEY DWELLING COMPLETIONS  PER ANNUM
Source: NSW Department of Planning, Metropolitan Development Monitor
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The National Housing Supply Council (NHSC) 
estimated that between 2000 and 2010, Sydney 
had accumulated a total housing shortage 
approximating 73,700 dwellings.6 This contraction 
in new housing supply inevitably spread to the 
rental sector, which experienced a substantial 
decline in vacancy rates as the shortage began to 
accumulate.
FIGURE 6 
SYDNEY RESIDENTIAL VACANCY RATES
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The McKell Institute notes that Sydney’s dwelling 
approvals and completions have increased 
markedly over the last few years, in large part 
thanks to persistently low interest rates encouraging 
investors back into the market. 
While dwelling completions are slowly return to their 
long-term average, the number of new approvals 
in recent years indicates an exceptionally strong 
period of new supply on the horizon. Last year, 
nearly 39,000 new dwellings were approved,7 
which should help reduce the scale of the housing 
shortage that accumulated across the first decade 
of this millennium. If some of this new supply is 
directed towards the rental market, it is likely that 
Sydney’s vacancy rate will improve somewhat. 
However, the recent surge in new supply does 
not automatically imply an easing of housing and 
rental prices. In 2014, the median price for a 
detached house in Australia increased by 7.1%, 
while unit prices increased by some 6%. This 
was overwhelmingly driven by steep increases 
in Sydney of 14.1% for houses 10.4% for units.8 
This followed equally large increases of 15.1% and 
10.9% the year before.9 In dollar terms, this means 
that in just two years, Sydney’s median house 
price has increased by approximately $210,000, 
while the median price for a unit has increased by 
just under $110,000.
For now, rents have remained largely constrained 
despite these significant increases. Sydney’s 
median rent for a detached housing has increased 
by just 4% over two years, less than the rate 
of inflation, while the median rent for a unit has 
increased by about 8.7%, above inflation though 
nowhere near as excessive as the rise in dwelling 
purchase price.
They key concern for policy makers as they 
consider reforms to negative gearing is whether 
any change to existing rules is likely to result in 
an increase in rents for cities like Sydney. Any 
impact is likely to be less notable while interest 
rates remain at historic lows, though the impact 
would undoubtedly become more pronounced 
once interest rates begin to return to their long 
term levels.
In November 2014, official data revealed that 
bank loans to property investors were surging at 
the fastest pace since the global financial crisis, 
reaching a record total of $475 billion.10 A 1% 
increase in the cost of servicing that debt would 
add almost $50 billion to the repayment obligations 
of the nation’s property investors, a substantial 
cost that would erode the profitability of the roughly 
one-third of positively geared investment properties 
in Australia. For the two-thirds of properties that are 
negatively geared, the extra costs would either need 
to be offset through a commensurate increase in 
rents, or where the market makes that more difficult 
to achieve, a large tax deduction through negative 
gearing. Under such a scenario, the current 
estimates of an annual $2.4 billion cost associated 
with negative gearing are unlikely to hold, with 
substantial increases in this burden likely. 
The Financial Systems Inquiry (FSI) recently 
warned policy makers that the boom in property 
investment was beginning to represent “a potential 
source of systemic risk for the financial system 
and the economy”. Specifically, the FSI report 
found that “the tax treatment of investor housing, 
in particular, tends to encourage leveraged and 
speculative investment”.
Given these concerns, it is appropriate that policy 
makers now revisit the issue of negative gearing, 
and that they do so with a careful eye on the 
impact that any changes would have on debt 
serviceability, and the potential for rental increases 
flowing from reform.
20
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Despite some similarities between that period 
and today, including low vacancy rates in most 
Australian cities, it is important to acknowledge that 
there are several critical differences that separate 
the previous period and the current one. 
This section of the report will consider both periods, 
before drawing some conclusions that would be 
noteworthy for policy makers considering change. 
In June 1985, the Hawke Government released 
its tax white paper, which among other 
recommendations, included a proposal to reform 
negative gearing rules so that losses on property 
investments were quarantined and could not be 
used to reduce the tax bill from other income 
streams.11 
The reform was expected to save approximately 
$475 million in today’s dollars, and was largely 
created in response to concerns that individuals on 
the highest tax rate – 62.5% including the Medicare 
Levy surcharge – were using the mechanism to 
rapidly reduce their taxation burden. 
At the time, the vast majority of home loans were 
capped at 13.5%,12  though a substantial number of 
loans issued after April 1985 were also being issued 
at even higher rates. There was a concern that the 
deductions were costing the budget substantial 
amounts of money at a time where it was struggling 
to contain inflation and higher costs of borrowing. 
As part of the same reform package, the 
Government also introduced a Capital Gains Tax, 
which applied to all assets except the family home. 
In a bid to supply new investment in housing supply, 
the Government also introduced a 4% depreciation 
allowance on housing investments.13   
By October 1986, it had become apparent that 
the reforms had failed to generate sufficient 
new investment in housing supply. The NSW 
Government argued that lending to building 
societies had dropped by some 35%, and 
suggested that Government increase the 
depreciation allowance to 8% to attract badly 
needed investment in rental properties.14 
Around this time, the Housing Industry Association 
(HIA) began to ramp up its campaign against the 
reforms. The HIA released data that showed that 
more than one-fifth of all renting households in 
Australia were forced to pay 35 per cent or more 
of their gross weekly income on rent. The HIA 
also pointed out that “public housing queues are 
growing rapidly in every State”.15 
When determining the most appropriate path forward for a reform of 
negative gearing, significant insights can be gathered by examining 
the period when negative gearing was abolished between 1985 and 
1987, as well as the period immediately following it.
What’s Changed:  
The Previous 
Abolition of Negative 
Gearing and Today
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Treasurer Paul Keating insisted at the time that the 
overwhelming factor deterring potential investors 
was high interest rates, needed to counter high 
inflation. By December 1986, the interest rate on 
loans to building societies had reached 15.5%,16 
with NSW particularly hard hit, as new dwelling 
commencements decline by some 28% on the 
previous year.17
By February 1987, the Real Estate Institute (REI) 
of NSW joined the HIA in blaming negative gearing 
for contributing to a “rental crisis” in Sydney. 
Though vacancy rates were already low in Sydney 
prior to the quarantining of negative gearing, REI 
NSW pointed out that many suburbs were now 
languishing with vacancy rates of just 0.5%, well 
below the 3% required for a balanced market.18 
In March, the Master Builders Federation of 
Australia released figures showing that Sydney 
rental prices had skyrocketed by 25% in the 
previous 12 months.19 The NSW REI predicted 
that rents would rise a further 20% over the next 
18 months, a concern also shared by the NSW 
Tenants Union.20
By April, BIS Shrapnel released data showing 
that the level of new dwelling constructions had 
plummeted to a 10 year low, and was forecasting 
that levels would decline a further 13% over the 
next year. BIS Shrapnel pointed out that the 
reduced capacity to negative gear had impacted 
the capacity of investors to service their loans, 
and that banks were requiring larger deposits to 
compensate for the increased risk. It was estimated 
that the quarantining of negative gearing had 
increased the average deposit required to buy a unit 
from around $45,700 to $114,200 (2014 dollars).21 
By June 1987, the Liberal Party announced that 
if elected, it would replace Labor’s prohibition of 
negative gearing on rental properties with a system 
allowing deductions from taxable income on interest 
incurred on borrowings up to 80 per cent of the 
value of the rental property. 
This received immediate support from the 
Confederation of Australian Industry (CAI) and the 
NSW REI,22 but was sternly criticized by the Tenants 
Union (TU) of NSW. 
TU spokesman Tracy Goulding argued that negative 
gearing had “not had the impact on the supply 
of housing as the REI would have us believe.” 
Goulding argued that “These taxes aren’t directly 
responsible for the housing crisis. The rental crisis 
is an ongoing thing, there was a shortage of rental 
properties before negative gearing was introduced; 
there has been a 10-year shortage.”23
Nevertheless, the Coalition began to ramp up 
its attacks on negative gearing as contributing 
to higher rental prices and longer public housing 
waiting lists. The Hawke Government had been 
hoping that dwelling approvals would begin to 
recover before the election, but ABS data showed 
that NSW dwelling approval figures continued to 
decline in June.24 
At this stage, the REI started a public campaign 
for the reinstatement of negative gearing, and sent 
questionnaires to all candidates in marginal Sydney 
seats. The REI also released data showing that 
there were now 300,000 households in the private 
rental market under the poverty line because of the 
rents householders have to pay.25
To combat a growing concern that the rental crisis 
could cost the government the election, Bob Hawke 
officially announced that his government would 
review negative gearing, while also acknowledging 
“the particular problem in Sydney in relation to the 
rental market”.26 
Despite the Prime Minister’s insistence that negative 
gearing might be reinstated, Paul Keating later 
went on to downplay the possibility of reforms, 
before making a strong argument that the current 
crisis was caused predominantly by high interest 
rates. Keating argued that he didn’t “think negative 
gearing ever added to the stock of housing 
accommodation. Had there been a whole stock of 
rental housing, we would have had better vacancy 
rates than we had”. Instead, Keating suggested that 
investors were not engaging because they were 
receiving an average 4 per cent return on money for 
which they had had to pay 16 to 17 per cent.27
The conflicting narratives on negative gearing 
arguably hurt the Hawke Government’s election 
performance in NSW. Premier Barry Unsworth 
pointed out that some of the party’s worst results 
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were in Western Sydney seats suffering through 
high rents,28 with political commentators also 
pointed out that there had been large swings in 
both Wollongong and Newcastle, two areas that 
were also suffering through a rental crisis.29  
In August, the NSW REI released new figures which 
showed that Sydney rental prices had increased 
by 66% in the previous 12 months, with an new 
prediction that they could increase by a further 30% 
in the coming year.30 
At this point, the West Australian Government 
began lobbying the Prime Minister to reform 
negative gearing so as to reintroduce it but for new 
housing only. The proposal was that the benefits 
should operate for the first five to seven years in a 
bid to stimulate construction of rental houses. The 
acting WA Premier, Mr Mal Bryce, said that the 
shortage of private rental accommodation was a 
major concern in the community, but also urged 
the government to not reintroduce the incentive for 
existing houses on the basis that it would drive up 
prices and eventually increase rents.31 
There was a growing concern within the Labor 
Party that the worsening rental crisis in Sydney was 
presenting a growth threat to the re-election of a state 
Labor Government. Premier Unsworth was set to go 
to the polls soon, and the crisis had become so bad 
that it became necessary for him to publicly lobby the 
Prime Minister to reinstate negative gearing.32 
Under growing pressure from his political base 
in NSW, the Treasurer began to consider several 
options for reform, including:33
 Allowing investors to claim interest expenses 
against gross rental income before deduction 
of operating expenses, which would allow 
more interest to be claimed as a tax deduction 
and increase returns to investors; 
 Allowing interest costs on up to a set 
percentage of borrowings, effectively setting 
an equity limit below which the negative 
gearing rules would not apply;
 Setting a borrowing limit on interest 
deductibility; and,
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 The West Australian Premier’s proposal to 
restrict negative gearing to new supply.
To make matters more complicated, new figures 
had emerged showing that Sydney’s median 
dwelling price had increased 12%, while vacancy 
rates remained at a very low 0.9%.34 The MBFA also 
released new data showing that the construction 
of “other dwellings” – including the more likely to 
be rented dwellings such as units, town houses 
and duplexes - had decreased 35 per cent since 
the cancellation of negative gearing by the Federal 
Government in July 1985.35 
In September, Treasurer Paul Keating took to cabinet 
a proposal that would allow investors to claim 
interest expenses as a tax deduction against gross 
rental income -a concession on the existing system 
which allows deductions only against net rent after 
allowing for operating costs such as maintenance, 
but cabinet was split and no decision was made.36 
Eventually, the Treasurer’s preferred approach was 
rejected, and the Government revealed that it would 
reinstate negative gearing in its entirety. To offset 
this change, the depreciation allowance on property 
investments was decreased from 4% to 2.5%.37  
Comparing our current situation to history, we 
have record low mortgage interest rates, extremely 
low vacancy rates and historically low gross 
rental returns. Low vacancy rates indicate that 
an immediate outright abolishment of negative 
gearing would result in an increase in rents in most 
cities. Record low interest rates indicate that even 
if negative gearing is phased out over 5 years, an 
increase in rents remains likely in the medium term as 
interest rates normalise. 
We are also faced with alarmingly high property 
prices driven by insufficient housing supply. When 
taken together, it becomes clear that existing 
investors need to be quarantined indefinitely 
to prevent sudden rental price increases, while 
future investors should be restricted to only using 
negative gearing on newly constructed properties 
so as to create new housing supply and improve 
affordability across all markets. This would represent 
a substantially different approach to the one put 
forward by the Hawke/Keating government in 1985.
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Options for  
Reform in Detail
Principles of tax 
deductibility:
The fundamental principle that should govern 
tax deductibility of expenditures is that all asset 
classes should operate on a level playing field. The 
introduction of negative gearing adhered to this 
principle. Why should real estate investments be 
treated differently to share market investments?
The ensuing years have answered this question. 
Investment in residential property is already privileged 
in a number of ways. First, and most importantly, 
it is much easier for individuals to borrow money 
to purchase an investment property than to invest 
in other asset classes. It is relatively easy to obtain 
finance to purchase an investment property with 
90 percent debt and 10 percent equity. The same 
cannot be said of other asset classes. An individual 
wishing to purchase equity securities with 10 percent 
equity faces much higher hurdles: both in terms of 
the transaction costs of obtaining the loan and the 
particulars of the loan (such as margin calls if the 
equity securities fall in price).
Negative gearing of rental property, in light of this, 
arguably does not provide a level playing field. There 
are also revenue considerations in term of the federal 
budget. These twin considerations underlie much of 
the recent discussion about proposed changes to 
negative gearing. We consider five different scenarios 
for addressing negative gearing.
SCENARIO 1:  
Business as usual. Under this scenario all current 
provision relating to negative gearing would be 
retained.
SCENARIO 2:  
Grandfather existing negatively geared 
properties. Under this scenario existing investors 
taking advantage of negative gearing would be 
allowed to continue to do so for the existing 
properties they own. Newly purchased rental 
properties would not be permitted to use negative 
gearing, but would be allowed to use so-called 
“positive gearing”. That is, interest and other 
deductions would be permitted, but could not be 
offset against other income.
SCENARIO 3:  
Grandfather existing negatively geared 
properties plus new participants have access to 
negative gearing for up to $1 million of property. 
Here, scenario 2 is augmented with a provision for 
newly negatively geared properties, but with a cap on 
the amount of such new properties.
SCENARIO 4:  
Grandfather existing negatively geared 
properties plus new negative gearing only for 
new construction. Under this scenario the only 
new negative gearing that would be permitted would 
be for new construction.
SCENARIO 5:  
Abolish negative gearing immediately. Under 
the final scenario we consider, the current tax 
deductibility of losses on investment properties 
would be abolished.
In analysing these scenarios we focus solely on 
direct negative gearing impacts on the budget and 
abstract from potential capital gains tax or other 
taxation implications.
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Analysis of the  
five scenarios:
SCENARIO 1:  
BUSINESS AS USUAL
The key driver of the cost of the current negative 
gearing arrangements going forward is the growth of 
deductible interest payments and other deductions 
on existing and newly negatively geared properties. 
Another important factor is the mix of taxpayers who 
make use of negative gearing, since those on higher 
incomes face a higher marginal tax rate
As the historical background above makes clear, it 
is hard to discern a smooth trend in growth rates 
of negative gearing. Although the current mix of tax 
brackets among negatively geared properties is 
known, it is unclear how this mix may change going 
forward, even with policy changes.
Furthermore, although it is straightforward 
to calculate the amount by which negative 
gearing  reduces taxable incomes (so-called “tax 
expenditure”), it is hard to know what the behavioural 
response would be by investors to policy changes. 
In the absence of a clear counterfactual information 
many commentators simply quote the tax 
expenditure number. Although one should be very 
cautious in interpreting such calculations, they do 
form a baseline for certain comparisons.
To get a sense of the potential growth in the tax 
expenditure “costs” going forward one can assume 
a 5% annual growth in negative gearing deductions 
overall, no changes to marginal tax rates, and no 
bracket creep. Under these assumptions the tax 
expenditure 5 years hence is $4.9 billion, compared 
to $3.9 on latest figures. The cumulative tax 
expenditure over 10 years would be $51 billion under 
these assumptions.
SCENARIO 1: CUMULATIVE TAX EXPENDITURE
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SCENARIO 2: GRANDFATHER 
EXISTING PROPERTIES
A key question under this scenario is how much of the 
existing tax deductions on existing properties would 
be reduced over time. If owners of grandfathered 
properties pay down the principle on their loans 
then a major (though not the only) driver of negative 
gearing deductions, totalling $24.1 billion in 2011-
2012.38 The rate of principle pay-down depends on 
the amortisation schedule of existing loans, and how 
those schedules may change yet be respected under 
this scenario. For instance, some investors may shift 
from amortising to interest-only loans in order to 
preserve the maximum interest deduction.
One policy option would be to prevent changes 
to existing amortisation schedules as part of the 
grandfather provisions. This, however, may be 
considered arbitrary and against the spirit of such 
a plan. On the other hand, if grandfather provisions 
apply to individual taxpayers, then those taxpayers 
will eventually lose the benefit of deductions as their 
other income declines over the lifecycle—and of 
course, would lose it completely upon death.
Given the range of policy implementations and 
endogenous responses of both borrowers and 
lenders, it is wise to consider three cases that span 
the likely possibilities of decline in loan balance and 
hence interest deductions. A base case involves a 
20-year aggregate pay-down of loan balances. A 
high case involves a 10-year aggregate pay-down. A 
conservative, low case assumes zero pay-down.39
Under the low case there is no budgetary impact 
since the existing stock of interest deductions is 
assumed to stay in place. Under the base and high 
cases the reductions are significant. The year 1 
budget benefit under the base case is $350 million, 
rising to $1.76 billion 5 years out—for a total deficit 
impact of $5.27 billion over the five years. In the high 
case these numbers are doubled40 the year 1 budget 
benefit is $700 million, rising to $3.52 billion in year 
and representing a $10.55 billion deficit impact over 
5 years. Over 10 years the cumulative base case 
budget impact is positive $19.3 billion and the high 
case is $38.7 billion.
SCENARIO 2: BUDGET BENEFIT RELATIVE TO STATUS QUO
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SCENARIO 3: GRANDFATHER 
EXISTING PROPERTIES AND 
ALLOW A $1 MILLION CAP 
ON TOTAL PROPERTY PRICES 
PAID PER PERSON FOR 
NEW NEGATIVE GEARING.
The key question in this scenario is how a capped 
allowance for new negative gearing would replace 
the attrition from existing gearing contemplated in 
scenario 2. This depends on the extent to which 
the cap would be binding measured against the 
underlying growth in scenario 1 (business as usual).
To understand this better it is useful to look at the 
distribution of negatively geared properties across 
individuals. Of the 1.76 million individuals with 
ownership of rental properties 1.28 million had one 
property interest, 318,295 had 2 and 96,991 had 3. 
Approximately 65,000 individuals had 4 or more.41
This suggests that a cap at a $1 million level would 
only be binding for a relatively small number of new 
investors even if their mix was the same as existing 
ones. Moreover, any cap could make that number 
salient and lead to greater negative gearing by 
new investors than would otherwise have been the 
case. On balance this scenario is likely to be closer 
to the business as usual scenario than any other. 
There may be some reduction in tax expenditures 
going forward, but they would be likely be slow to 
materialise at best, and it is unclear that they would 
be large in magnitude.
Using the current mix of the number of rental 
properties owned it is plausible to think that the cap 
would only bind for those with 3 or more properties. 
These represent approximately 24.3% of the existing 
stock.42 One can think of the potential benefit here as 
being 24.3% of the scenario 2 cases. For example, 
in the base case the potential 10 year cumulative 
impact could be 24.3% of $19.3 billion for a total of 
$4.7 billion. Relative to the status quo where negative 
gearing is growing the 10 year cumulative impact is 
more than $7.7 billion over 10 years.
SCENARIO 3: BUDGET BENEFIT RELATIVE TO STATUS QUO
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SCENARIO 4: GRANDFATHER 
EXISTING PROPERTIES AND 
ALLOW NEW NEGATIVE 
GEARING ONLY FOR NEW 
HOUSING STOCK.
The first part of this scenario is identical to scenario 
2 and the budgetary impact is therefore identical. 
The second part of this scenario is allowing negative 
gearing for new housing stock only.
One important benefit of this scenario is that it 
provides tax incentives for the provision of new 
housing. It is widely recognised that—particularly in 
certain markets such as Sydney—supply constraints 
are an important driver of the high housing prices.43 
Incentives for additional supply can come from many 
sources, such as new land releases and relaxation of 
zoning restrictions.
The current portion of negatively geared property 
in new housing is around 5%.44 Hence, given the 
overall magnitude of negative gearing—in 2010-11 
there were 1.2 million individuals with negatively 
geared properties—a shift in tax incentives toward 
new construction has the potential to have a material 
impact on housing supply.
Of course, any new housing supply that is subject to 
negative gearing provides tax benefits to investors 
and reduces the budgetary benefits from the 
grandfather provisions in scenario 2. It is therefore 
important to weigh up the benefits that come from 
increased housing supply and construction, with the 
opportunity costs (relative to scenario 2) of continued 
tax deductibility.
An important consideration in this scenario is, of 
course, what is meant by “new construction”. This 
raises a number of questions and possibilities. A 
stringent policy would permit negative gearing only 
for construction on newly released land. At the more 
permissive end, the demolition of an existing property 
followed by new construction on it would qualify. 
Since an important part of the benefit of new housing 
is increased capacity, not merely increased quality, it 
would seem natural to limit the availability of negative 
gearing to new housing which increases the number 
of people accommodated by a certain amount.
In addition to the important benefits that would 
flow from incentives for increased housing supply, 
this scenario has the additional benefit of boosting 
the construction sector. The Housing Industry 
Association estimates that nationwide around 
185,000 new homes need to be built each year to 
meet both population growth and demand for new 
housing.45 According to the ABS, the current annual 
value of new residential construction is around $45 
billion. Although it is beyond the scope of this report 
to provide a detailed estimate of the amount this 
would increase due to the tax incentives involved in 
this scenario, a plausible estimate is that a net 10 
percent increase could occur. 
Were this to occur it would add $4.5 billion to GDP. 
If the current overall tax-to-GDP ratio of 25.8 percent 
applied this would lead to an increase in tax revenues 
of $1.2 billion annually. This would more than offset 
the “lost” revenue on the 5% of currently negatively 
geared new construction properties relative to 
scenario 2. Indeed, based on the assumptions 
above and no incremental growth it would lead to 
an additional annual budget benefit of approximately 
$1 billion per annum. Taking the base case from 
scenario 2, this would put the cumulative 10-year 
budget benefit at $41.7 billion.
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SCENARIO 4:  
BUDGET BENEFIT RELATIVE TO STATUS QUO (BASE CASE)
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SCENARIO 5: END NEGATIVE 
GEARING IMMEDIATELY
This is the most radical policy proposal of the five 
considered here. A naïve account of the budget 
impact of such a policy is that the existing $3.9 billion 
in net deductions46 would become an immediate 
improvement in the budget bottom line.47 Of course, 
there are a variety of endogenous responses that 
would surely occur as investors in rental properties 
change their financial arrangements.
Faced with the loss of valuable tax deductions, 
investors currently negatively gearing properties 
would have a strong incentive to move to other 
asset classes where tax losses could continue to 
be offset against other income. Although it is easier 
for most individuals to take advantage of these tax 
advantages on residential properties, under this 
scenario that may no longer be the case. Lenders 
would have an incentive to make lending more easily 
available on other asset classes (such as shares), 
and financial planners would also have incentives to 
change their recommendations. Thus there would be 
incentives on the demand side, the supply side, and 
from intermediaries for a shift from negative geared 
property to other tax advantaged investments. 
Any such shift would reduce the potential benefit 
of ending negative gearing – and could do so to a 
material degree. 
There is also the question of whether ending negative 
gearing would increase rental prices. The Grattan 
Institute argues that this would not be the case:
The belief that negative gearing 
keeps rents low seems to be 
a folk memory from when the 
Hawke Government temporarily 
abolished negative gearing in 
the 1980s. Rents rose rapidly 
in Sydney and Perth. But rents 
were stable in Melbourne and 
Brisbane and the rate of growth 
fell in Adelaide. In Sydney and 
Perth population growth and 
insufficient new housing, not tax 
policy, were pushing up rents. 
Economic theory predicts that 
abolishing negative gearing 
shouldn’t change rents. Every 
time an investor sells a property 
to a renter, there is one less 
rental property, and one less 
renter – in other words, no 
change to the balance between 
supply and demand of rental 
properties.48
It is dangerous to simply look at events after a policy 
changed and attribute a causal effect to the policy 
change – many other things are typically going on, 
and indeed those factors sometime cause the policy 
change themselves.49 Looking at the difference 
between two markets before and after the change 
(e.g. the difference in Sydney before and after 
compared to the difference in Melbourne before and 
after) is more information.50 Yet the small sample 
anecdotal evidence offered in the above quote is 
not compelling. It is an open empirical question as 
to whether negative gearing decreases rents or not. 
Finally, the claim that “economic theory predicts that 
abolishing negative gearing shouldn’t change rents” 
is not as clear as claimed. Differences in household 
size and composition between investors and renters 
of the same properties. This may or may not be the 
case, but it is an implicit assumption in the above 
claim.
Perhaps the most serious concern regarding ending 
negative gearing immediately is the impact on 
financial distress and the possibility of forced selling. 
Nearly 60% of investment properties loans are 
interest only.51 Although borrowing on an interest-only 
basis is not a necessary marker of being financially 
constrained, it does indicate a clear desire not to 
make principal repayments on the loan(s). Although 
it is an open question as to how borrowers would 
respond to a significant decrease in their post-tax 
income due to the abolition of negative gearing, one 
possibility is that there could be a large number of 
existing properties placed on the market in a short 
space of time. Such correlated selling would place 
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downward pressure on property prices and potential 
result in lower realised sale prices. Such an erosion 
of financial position could cause material financial 
distress for a non-trivial number of existing investors. 
It is, of course, impossible to say what the probability 
or a large-scale negative event is, but it is worth 
noting that scenario 5 is the only scenario considered 
here that entails such a risk.
It is worth noting that some proponents of this 
scenario, such as the Grattan Institute, suggest 
that it may be phased in over five years.52 This may 
smooth the impact of some of the factors discussed 
above, but investors would anticipate the phased-in-
changes, and selling pressure may be front-ended in 
such circumstances.
The following chart compares the 10 year cumulative 
impact of scenarios 1-4 as detailed above. Because 
of the existing nearly $4 billion tax expenditure cost, 
and the potential growth in negative gearing scenario 
1 (do nothing) represents a $51 billion cumulative 
impact. Scenario 3, grandfathering plus a cap on 
new negative gearing makes relatively little difference. 
The most appealing option is scenario 4 which has 
a potential budget improvement of $41.7 billion 
cumulatively over 10 years. Scenario 5 is sufficiently 
radical and entails such risks that we have not 
sought to put a number on its impact.
FIGURE 7 
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Conclusion
Making all investments equal from a 
taxation perspective does not make 
sense if there exist other forces that 
systematically advantage one asset 
class. It has become increasingly 
clear over recent years that there are 
negative externalities that could be, 
at least in part, internalised into the 
price system by changes to negative 
gearing.
Of the five scenarios considered here, 
the one which would likely be most 
effective in doing so, while minimising 
the negative consequences of 
removal is scenarios 4: grandfathering 
existing negative gearing but only 
allowing new negative gearing for 
new construction. This would help 
tackle the serious issue of constrained 
housing supply, allow for a smooth 
transition for existing investors, and 
have important indirect benefits in the 
housing construction sector.  It would 
also have a material and positive  
impact on the federal budget which 
could easily be more that $5 billion 
over 5 years.
Negative gearing was introduced with the purpose of providing a 
level-playfield for all classes of assets in which individual Australian 
payers may invest. Over time, however, developments in capital 
markets such as financial innovation and lower real interest rates 
affecting returns to deposit savings, combined with the structure  
of the Australian banking system, and also the economic psychology 
of investors, have shifted the playing field.
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